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PREFACE

Thirty three million Americans, 14 percent of the entire population,
are estimated to be living in poverty.

A popular conception of such

people is that they either cannot or will not work.

While it is true

that a sizeable portion of those in poverty cannot work because of their
age or their health, and there are undoubtedly some people who prefer
poverty to work, a very substantial portion of those living in poverty,
approximately 9.1 million, are members of families where at least one
member works, and often works full-time (Smith and Varichek 1987).
There has been an ongoing controversy for at least the last thirty
years over the direction that government policy should proceed as concerns
poverty.

Few federal policy guestions have attracted so much basic

disagreement.

Numerous books, studies, and papers have been published

that all offer prescriptions for the reduction or total elimination
of poverty.

Most of those formulas either call for raising the minimum

wage or abandoning it.

Perhaps no other guestion so neatly categorizes

authors into two opposing ideologies, liberalism and conservatism.
The liberals see the minimum wage as positive policy, a powerful tool
that can enable those on the bottom rung of the economic ladder to accrue
the basic necessities for a humane standard of living.

Michael Harrington,

a widely respected author and political activist, states in his book,
The New American Poverty, that "No one who works full-time should be
poor . . . the minimum wage and the various support programs should
be set at levels that guarantee a nonpoverty income for every working
citizen of the United States."

(Harrington 1984, 248).

On the other hand, Edward C. Banfield, a noted scholar and educator
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tells us, in The Unheavenly City Revisited, to " . . . remove impediments
to the employment of the unskilled,
(Banfield 1974, 269).

...

by repealing the minimum wage.

. . .

The conservatives view the minimum wage as contributing

to increased unemployment - a negative policy.

They explain that it

reduces the number of jobs that are available due to the artificially high
cost of labor.
These opposing opinions are not just restricted to the ranks of
scholars and theorists but take on very real meaning in a forum that
can have profound effect on every low income family in America, the
United States Congress.

The following viewpoints were expressed in

testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources during
minimum wage hearings in July of 1987.

Lane Kirkland, president of

the AFL-CIO stated the liberal position:
A fair minimum wage is a policy issue and most fundamentally
an issue of self-worth for individuals and self-respect for a
nation that doesn't want to exploit anyone for the benefit of others.
America must not allow the economic exploitation of its weakest
workers - it must maintain a fair minimum wage (Congressional Digest
1987, 66:208).
Mr. Walter Ellis, Jr., president of the American Farm Bureau Federation,
ably expressed the conservative fear:
Numerous studies have shown that the federal minimum wage does
not accomplish its original purpose of alleviating poverty. Any
increase in the minimum wage will reduce available jobs . . . this
bill could destroy a half-million jobs (Congressional Digest 1987,
66:203).
Curiously, both liberals and conservatives cite economic theory
and both produce seemingly endless streams of data to prove their point;
more curiously, both sides present convincing arguments.

The liberals

say a strong minimum wage is good for society; the conservatives tell
us it is bad.

The purpose of this paper is not to solve this dilemma,
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but to examine its basis and to more fully understand the conflicting
viewpoints.
This is a paper about the minimum wage and how it affects a substantial
number of Americans living in poverty.

It concerns those workers who,

for whatever reason, are at the bottom of the wage scale pyramid and
for whom even full-time employment is insufficient to raise themselves
and their families out of poverty.

It is also about the minimum wage

as an incentive for those in poverty to choose gainful employment as
an alternative to relying on federally sponsored welfare programs.
Chapter one will explain the origins and development of minimum
wage legislation as well as provide a thorough examination of the current
law and its coverage.

The second chapter will present the classical

arguments of orthodox wage theory and examine the important concepts
of labor supply, demand, and elasticity.

It will also address the popular

neo-classical economic theories, internal and dual labor markets, which
are probably closer to the way the economy really works.

Some current

labor demand elasticity estimates will be presented to show the derived
effects upon jobs and incomes if the estimates and theories are accurate.
In chapter three the role of the minimum wage as it pertains to
poverty and the working poor will be covered as well as its potential
costs and benefits to society.

Regardless of the economic theory and

statistical measurements one chooses to subscribe to, the bottom line
in federal wage policy is political.

Chapter four will examine the

issues and goals of such policy in the political context and provide
a description of the political arena in which the legislation must compete.
Any recommendation for change should be one that can realistically
be expected to attain the maximum societal benefit at the minimum societal
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cost. It must also be one that is palatable to both liberals and conservatives
as well as one that can compete well amongst the other agenda priorities
of a shrinking federal budget.

Chapter five will attempt to present

just such a recommendation.

vi

CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND

History
Proposals for government regulation of hours and wages first arose
in this country in the late 19th century.

The widely accepted philosophy

of the period, at least the philosophy of those in economic positions
from which they could be heard, was Social Darwinism.

The philosophy

placed great emphasis on individualism and self-reliance and interpreted
economic success or failure as natural and just conditions.

"Survival

of the fittest" justified protecting employer interests with no regard
for the rights of the employed.

Mandating employee protections such

as wages and hours represented a conflict between laissez-faire economic
ideals and society's altruistic concern for the welfare of its deprived
citizens (Levitan, Carlson, and Shapiro 1986).

That conflict persists

today.
In 1892 Congress first established standards for employee protection
within the federal government.

It was not an attempt to regulate private

industry but merely an avowal by an individual employer, the government,
to provide wage and hour guidelines for its own employees.

This was

the origin of the eight-hour day.
Early attempts to regulate the private sector in this regard were
undertaken by individual states, not the federal government.

In 1912

Massachusetts enacted the first minimum wage law and this precedent
was quickly followed by eight more states the following year.

State

laws generally provided for industry wage boards to establish the standards
rather than mandating state-wide requirements.
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Furthermore, most of

the early laws covered only women and minors and were not vigorously
enforced.

As the movement toward state regulation spread it was continually

challenged in the courts.

By 1930, although seventeen states had previously

enacted minimum wage laws, seven were found to be unconstitutional and
three had been repealed.

The remaining seven states enforced their

laws with great trepidation (Levitan and Belous 1979).
Renewed interest in employee protection grew out of the economic
hardship wrought by the Great Depression.

In 1933 Congress passed the

National Industrial Recovery Act which was the first federal move into
labor regulation in the private sector.

It recognized labor as an economic

entity and attempted to reverse the problems of the depression through
a new cooperation between government, business, and labor.

Although

ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935, the National
Industrial Recovery Act had established labor's identity as a party
to the depression crisis (Levitan and Belous 1979).
In 1937 President Franklin D. Rossevelt requested legislation to
establish federal wage and hour standards.

The standards were to apply

to all workers and, patterned after earlier state laws, were to be administered
by a wage and hour board on an industry by industry basis.

President

Roosevelt's much amended proposal became law in 1938 as the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).
The FLSA specified a minimum wage and established the 40-hour work
week.

It also required payment of an overtime premium and restricted

child labor.

The purpose of the law was to require employers to pay

a socially acceptable return on labor and to spread employment opportunity
by requiring overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the standard
work week (CCH 1985).

The original act set the wage floor at 25 cents
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an hour with stepped increases to 40 cents an hour by 1945.

FLSA coverage,

however, was narrowly defined as pertaining to those workers directly
engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate
commerce.

Thus restricted, and with numerous exemptions, the Act only

covered 25 percent of the workforce.

It excluded large segments that

were most in need of the protection such as retail trade, service, and
agriculture (Levitan, Carlson, and Shapiro 1986).
Congress has since amended the act on several occasions resulting
in both increases in the wage rate and in expansion of coverage.

In

1949 the wage floor was increased to 75 cents an hour and then to one
dollar in 1955; to $1.25 in 1961, and to $1.60 effective in 1968.

The

1977 amendment increased the minimum wage in stair-step fashion to $2.65
effective in 1978, $2.90 for 1979, $3.10 for 1980, and to $3.35 to be
paid in 1981.

Each increase was accompanied by lengthy debate and by

reevaluation of the entire minimum wage concept.
In the 1949 amendment there was a general readjustment of industries
covered, while some previous exemptions were removed, many were added.
The amendment effectively decreased the coverage of the FLSA primarily
for employers of small numbers of workers.

In 1958 numerous bills expanding

coverage were debated but it was not until 1961 that coverage was appreciably
increased.

The 1961 law provided for interim sub-minimum wages that

could be paid by newly covered employers which increased to the national
minimum by 1965.

Coverage was again expanded in 1966 and, again, an

interim sub-minimum was allowed until 1971 to ease the burden on the
newly covered employers.

For the first time workers in agriculture

came under minimum wage protection, albeit at reduced rates and with
numerous stipulations.

The 1966 amendment was important also in that
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it covered workers in many areas of public employment such as schools,
mass transit, and state-run institutions.

Congress continued its expansion

of coverage in 1974 and again in 1977 to the point where today nearly
ninety percent of the total nonsupervisory workforce is subject to the
law (Congressional Digest 1987,66).
The minimum wage has been traditionally set at roughly fifty percent
of the average hourly wage paid to nonsupervisory workers in private
industry (Cohadas 1987).

It should be noted that during the 1950's

and 1960's there was a close relationship between them with a slight,
but not expansive, departure from tradition during the 1970's (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
MINIMUM,
WAGE vs. 50% AVERAGE WAGE
-------------------------------

Source:.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 45, March 7, 1987, p.404
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tee 1981, while average wages have continued to climb, the minimum
fe has been frozen at $3.35.

For the past eight years the ratio of

rnings allotted to the minimum wage earner has shown relative decline
the point where in 1987 it constituted only about thirty eight percent
the average nonsupervisory wage.

To readjust the 1987 wage floor

traditional standards would have reguired an increase of about $1.05
hour to $4.40.
rrent Coverage
While approximately ninety percent of nonsupervisory hourly paid
rkers are now subject to the provisions of the FLSA, ten percent,
approximately eight million, receive no minimum wage protection
Imith and Vavrichek 1987).

An examination of the coverage is now in

■der.
)vered
As originally enacted the FLSA applied only to those workers directly
agaged in interstate commerce.

Since 1938 the volume of interstate

ommerce has expanded dramatically as well as the number of employers
hus engaged.

The various amendments to the act have also expanded

he meaning of interstate commerce to include many other types of jobs,
manufacturers who produce goods that will cross state lines, those engaged
n interstate communications,

and wholesalers whose employees receive,

>rder, or keep records of goods between states are all subject to the
_aw.

It also covers employees who mine, produce, process, or distribute

joods even though those goods may eventually leave the state through
another company.

Furthermore, the law applies to all employees of a

covered employer regardless of an employee's specific duties.

Thus,

a janitor for such a company is also covered even though his or her
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job is not directly related to interstate commerce.
In addition to those employees loosely construed as being engaged
in interstate conmerce, the law now applies specifically to laundries
and dry cleaners, construction, health care, higher education, retail
and service businesses with yearly sales of $365,000 or more, and to
any other employer with annual sales or income of at least $250,000.
It also covers such casual workers as maids, day workers, housekeepers,
chauffers, cooks, and full-time babysitters if they receive at least
fifty dollars in wages in any calendar quarter (Hunt 1984).
Uncovered
Employees not covered include those who work for independent retail
and service businesses with annual sales of less than $365,000 and other
employers who do not meet the interstate commerce criteria and also
have incomes of less than $250,000 a year.

Exemptions from the Act

are also specifically provided for executive, administrative or professional
employees, outside sales persons, or employees of amusement or recreational
businesses having seasonal peaks.

Although most agricultural and fishing

industry employees are subject to minimum wage provisions, they are
not afforded overtime protection.

Part-time babysitters and companions

for old or ill people who cannot care for themselves are totally uncovered
as are, of course, those that are self-employed (CCH 1985).
One modification to the minimum wage pertains to employees who work
in jobs where they customarily receive tips, such as food servers and
some hotel employees.

The law stipulates that if workers receive over

$30 a month in tips then the employer is allowed to take a tip credit
of up to 40 percent of the hourly minimum.

Thus, tipped employees may

be paid as little as $2.01 per hour with the remainder of the minimum
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being derived through the tips they receive. (CCH 1985).

Employers

must be continually aware of the amount of tips received to know that
individual employees are receiving the minimum.

Conversely, employees

should be knowledgeable of the law to be sure that they are receiving
what they should.

There is little evidence to indicate that either

is the case (Levitan, Carlson, and Shapiro 1986).
A further provision of the law permits full-time students to be
employed at 85 percent of the federal minimum, or $2.85 an hour.

Such

employment may be part-time during the school year or full-time during
vacation periods.

Employers in retail or service businesses, agriculture,

or higher education may take advantage of this provision through a certification
procedure from the Department of Labor.

Employers of handicapped persons

in sheltered workshops and learners in industries other than retail
or service may also receive certification to pay subminimum wage rates
(Congressional Digest 1985,64).

Although the rules and stipulations

governing subminimum employment are complicated, most reguests are approved
pro forma (Levitan and Belous 1979).
The separate states and jurisdictions are free to establish their
own minimum wages above that of the federal law or to extend coverage
to the uncovered areas.

All but nine states, primarily in the south,

have legislated one or the other, or both, forms of wage action.

Coverage

is currently provided for all employees in eighteen jurisdictions.
Ten of those; Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont,
have established universal coverage that is higher than the
minimum.

federal

Although the provisions of the ELSA have remained unchanged

since 1981, that has not been the case among the states.
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In 1987 alone

seventeen states took action to increase their rates and/or extend their
coverage (CCH 1985) (Nelson 1988).
The responsibility for enforcing the minimum wage rests with the
Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department.

Employers can be fined

for violations as well as be required to make restitution in the form
of back-pay to individual employees.

Court action may be sought by

individual employees, groups of employees, or by the government on behalf
of employees.

Suits may not, however, be brought by unions (CCH 1985).

The majority of the Division's investigatory effort is spent in evaluating
employee complaints and allegations.

When a violation is found to have

occurred the employer is normally given the opportunity to comply voluntarily
before being taken to court.

This process assumes that most employees

are aware of the minimum wage laws and that they are willing to file
complaints.

Some workers, even if they are aware of the laws, may be

afraid to file complaints against their employers for fear of losing
their jobs.

Naturally illegal aliens, undercutting the wage protection

afforded American workers to the advantage of unscrupulous employers,
would not be inclined to file complaints.

Attempts to specify the extent

to which violations currently occur would be tenuous at best.

Suffice

it to say that at least some employees who are covered under the law
are not receiving the minimum wage (Levitan and Belous 1979).
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CHAPTER TOO
ORTHODOX WAGE THEORY

Supply, Demand, and Elasticity
The basic disagreement between liberals and conservatives as to
the desirability of the minimum wage can be illustrated through rudimentary
orthodox wage theory.

In figure 1 the vertical axis represents wages

per hour and the horizontal axis numbers of employees.

The diagonal

curve, D, represents the labor demand of a theoretical employer.

In

this simplistic representation it is shown that forty five employees
will be hired when the wage rate is $2.00 per hour, point A on the demand
curve.

If the cost of labor, wages, increases to $6.00 per hour the

employer will only wish to hire fifteen employees, point B.

The demand

curve is downward sloping because the employer wishes to add employees
only to the point where the added cost of each equals the added contribution
of their productivity.

This reflects a basic economic principle that

the price (wages) should equal the value of the marginal product of
each unit of production (labor).
FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

W

S

$6

$2

D
15

45

L

15

DEMAND

SUPPLY
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However, the demand for labor is only part of the picture, supply
must also be considered.

Figure 2 represents the same wage and labor

quantity relationship but this time labor supply, the number of persons
willing to be hired, is shown by the diagonal curve, S.

Suppose the

theoretical employer is paying wages of $2.00 per hour, there may be
fifteen people willing to work, point C.

If, for some reason, the employer

raises the hourly wage to $6.00, there will now be forty five people
willing to be employed, point D.

The supply curve is upward sloping

because raising the hourly wage induces more people to view that wage
as preferable to the returns of not working.
If the demand and supply curves are superimposed, as in figure 3,
the combined effects are shown.

A given hourly wage will induce a certain

number of people to want to work, but the employer will only pay a wage
up to the marginal productivity of each additional worker.

In this case

the model indicates equilibrium at point E, thirty workers earning $4.00
per hour each.

Should the employer pay less than $4.00, he would restrict

the number of employees willing to work and therefore his profits.
If he paid more than $4.00, he would be able to hire more workers but
their productivity would be less than what he is paying them and the
employer would lose money.
to work at $4.00.

Conversely, thirty people will be willing

Those requiring something less than $4.00 an hour

for their time would be happy to accept the increased benefits.

Those

who value their free time more than $4.00 an hour would choose not to
work.

The forces of supply and demand, then, create a natural equilibrium

in the wage rate and labor quantity relationship, point E, allowing
both the employer and the employees to obtain the maximum benefit in
light of the constraints produced by the other (Hamermesh 1984).
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FIGURE 3

FIGURE 4

|
i

EQUILIBRIUM

JOB LOSS

Now consider the minimum wage which artificially changes the relationship,
see figure 4.

If a minimum wage is established below the equilibrium

point, say at $3.00, point F, there will be no change in the relationship.
The employer will still offer $4.00 and he will still find thirty willing
employees.

However, should the wage floor be arbitrarily set at $5.00

an hour, while as many as thirty eight people will be willing to work
for the higher wage, point G, the employer will only be willing to hire
twenty three, point H.

To hire more than twenty three people at the

higher wage rate would entail paying more than the value of the marginal
productivity of the additional workers.

Thus, if the cost of labor

is raised to $5.00 an hour, seven people will lose their jobs and become
unemployed.

This is not the only effect of forcing up the wage rate.

Whereas at $4.00, thirty people were willing to work, at the new rate
of $5.00 thirty eight people are seeking jobs.

Rather than just adding

the seven people who lost their jobs to the number of unemployed, the
additional eight job seekers must be added for a total of fifteen.
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This is because the level of unemployment is defined not just as job
losers, but includes those who would be employed at the current wage
rate if an opening were available (Levitan and Belous 1979).
It is clear in this scenario that by establishing the minimum wage
at $5.00, one dollar above the equilibrium wage, that fifteen people
are now considered unemployed.

But the relationship of one dollar to

fifteen people is by no means constant, it depends upon the slope of
the curves.

Consider if the slopes of the curves are altered as in

figures 5 and 6.
I

[GURE 5

- - - - - -

i- FIGURE 6

In figure 5 the increase of one dollar an hour above equilibrium will
result in the loss of only three jobs and a total increase in unemployment
of only six people.

However, in figure 6, with the slopes drastically

altered, the one dollar increase will result in twenty five lost jobs
and twenty five more people now seeking employment, for a total of fifty
added to the ranks of the unemployed.

Herein lies the crux of the disagreement

between the liberals and the conservatives; what are the correct slopes
of the supply and demand curves?

The liberals would have us believe
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that they are fairly steep, as in figure 5, resulting in only small
changes in the number of unemployed.

The conservatives see the curves

as flatter, figure 6, where a small increase in the minimum wage produces
a large increase in the number of unemployed.

The slopes of the curves

indicate elasticity.
The concept of elasticity concerns the degree of change on one axis
of the model, labor quantity, brought about by an incremental change
on the other axis, wage rates.

In other words, if the wage rate changes

by one percent, what percentage of change in labor quantity will be
observed?

If a one percent change in wages causes exactly a one percent

change in labor quantity, then the elasticity of demand equals one.
But if a one percent change in wages produces less than a corresponding
one percent change in labor quantity, then the elasticity of demand
is less than one, as in figure 5.

If it produces greater than a one

percent change then the elasticity is greater than one, figure 6.
There is definitely a tradeoff between wage rates and the quantity
of labor both demanded by, and available to, employers.

There is no

question that an artificially imposed minimum wage which is above the
equilibrium wage will result in increased unemployment.

To determine

how much unemployment one needs to know the slopes of the curves, or,
as represented as percentages of change, the elasticities (Hamermesh
1984).

Since good elasticity estimates are vital to the determination,

numerous studies have been conducted on this subject.

Elasticity of

labor demand not only varies greatly from industry to industry, but
within industries as well.

It is also constantly shifting due to technological

change in production methods and changes in the price elasticities of
product consumers.

For instance, an industry whose costs of production

13

can readily be passed on to consumers in the form of higher product
prices, like a public utility, would have a labor demand elasticity
of well under one.

That is, as the cost of labor increases, very few

workers would be laid off, the additional labor costs would simply be
added to the product price.

In very competitive industries, such as

fast food enterprises, an increase in wages could not be readily passed
on to the consumer.

If they raised the price of their final product

their customers would simply buy their fast food elsewhere.

Although

an increase in the minimum wage would theoretically raise all fast food
prices simultaneously, the cost of labor is not the only factor involved.
The increased costs may be met by some businesses through substitution
of more efficient equipment for labor.

Others may temporarily sacrifice

profits to obtain a larger share of the market.

Those businesses that

are already operating at peak efficiency and with narrow profit margins
would be forced to raise their hamburger prices and may lose many of
their customers, perhaps even be forced out of business.

Substitution

of equipment for labor and business failures would both result in increased
unemployment.

In this case the elasticity of labor demand would be

greater than one.
Another very important variable in the determination of labor demand
elasticity is the impact of labor costs on the total price of the employer's
product or service.

If labor costs constitute a large proportion of

product price then increases in wages would necessitate relatively large
increases in product price or worker lay-offs.

Conversely, where labor

costs contribute to only a small proportion of the product or service
price, then an increase in wages would produce only a small increase
in price, an increase easily accepted by consumers resulting in few,
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if any, lay-offs.

There are numerous other variables that also affect

elasticity in this manner (Levitan and Belous 1979).
Since labor demand elasticities are so variable and because they
are constantly changing, the numerous inquiries into the subject have
produced a wide variety of answers.

The liberals or conservatives have

had only to select those studies which have shown elasticities that
support their point of view.
Job Rationing
Figure 7 shows two supply and demand scenarios, the one on the left
for the sector covered by the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA and
the one on the right depicts employment not subject to the law, the
uncovered sector.

If there were no minimum wage, or if it were set

at less than the equilibrium wage, then both sectors would remain at
equilibrium; wages at W q and employment at E q . When the minimum wage
is introduced, above equilibrium, the covered sector is forced to raise
wages to

and employment is reduced to E .

FIGURE 7

COVERED SECTOR
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The non-covered sector

t

does not have to raise wages, but nor does it have to remain at the
current equilibrium point.

Because many of the workers who lost jobs

in the covered sector must now look for employment in the uncovered
sector, the supply curve in the uncovered sector shifts out to the right,
S q to S^, reflecting the spillover in job seekers.

The uncovered sector

can now seek a new equilibrium with wages at W 2 and employment at E^.
In this case, the minimum wage has resulted in higher wages for those
still employed in the covered sector, but for those in the uncovered
sector it has meant not only a decrease in wages, but an increase in
the number of low paying jobs.

The number of jobs lost in one sector

and gained in the other will of course depend upon the elasticities
involved.

There will also be some workers who lose jobs in the covered

sector who refuse to work at the low wages in the uncovered sector.
They will either go on unemployment and continue to look for a job at
the higher wage or may lose hope and drop out of the work force entirely.
The size of the labor supply shift in the uncovered sector caused
by the spillover is very important.

If the number of workers in the

covered sector were small relative to the uncovered sector, the magnitude
of the shift in the supply curve, for a given elasticity, would also
be small.

However, today's FLSA coverage applies to approximately ninety

percent of the non-supervisory work force.

If jobs were lost in the

covered sector due to a mandated wage increase, the number of workers
seeking jobs in the uncovered sector might increase dramatically.

This

would cause a pronounced shift in the uncovered supply curve and drive
the uncovered rages even lower and the number of unemployed even higher.
To rehire the total number of job losers in the uncovered sector would
drive the wage rate to an unacceptably low level, a level so low that
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society would not be likely to accept it (Levitan and Belous 1979).
Neo-Classical Theories of Wages and Employment
While orthodox wage theory provides us with a workable model of
the relationship between wages and employment, the operation of real
world employment economics is probably more accurately described by
a combination of two neo-classical theories; internal and dual labor
markets.
Internal Labor Market
If an individual employee is engaged in piece work in a mass production
setting it may be possible to accurately determine the value of his
or her productivity.

However, the value of most workers' productivity

cannot be readily ascertained.

It would be extremely difficult to measure

the productivity of, for example, a secretary or a mid-level manager.
Since specific valuations of productivity cannot be accurately determined
for most jobs the pricing and allocation of labor is primarily assigned
by a set of prescribed rules rather than by pure labor market forces.
Thus, wages tend to be tied to specific jobs rather than to individual
workers and workers receive pay increases primarily by working their
way up the job scale through a series of promotions and seniority based
on longevity with the employer.
This theory claims that most positions other than at the low paying
entry level are filled through internal promotion.

It also points out

that most employers provide firm-specific training, that is, training
of value in that specific firm but of relatively little value to the
worker in seeking employment elsewhere.

Because of this, lower level

workers can normally be paid at a rate that is somewhat below the value
of their production.

On the other hand, as an incentive for remaining
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with the firm, mid and upper level employees are normally paid at a
rate which is proportionately higher than their individual productivity.
Thus the average wage may egual the average worker's productivity, but
not that of the individual worker.

Furthermore, there exists a certain

wage rigidity in employment that prevents wages from decreasing in the
short term in response to market conditions.

Workers having become

accustomed to a certain wage level will vigorously resist any decrease
in that wage so long as they have any alternative.
The implications of the internal labor market are that most jobs
other than at the entry level are filled from within, that firm-specific
training ties lower level workers to the employer while they earn less
than their value to the employer, and that upper level workers are paid
somewhat more than their direct contribution to production.

The extra

pay earned by upper level workers is partially offset by their efforts
in training those at lower levels and in providing the incentive for
those at lower levels to do well at their jobs.

This theory helps to

explain why most companies have mandatory retirement guidelines for
senior employees which put a cap on the wage scale.

The concept of

wage rigidity explains why most employers respond to market down-turns
by laying off workers rather than by decreasing wages.

To maintain

the incentive that seniority provides, most lay-offs occur among the
lower paid workers rather than their more senior and higher paid counterparts.
Because once hired, an employee will eventually gain seniority and will
become relatively expensive, applicants at the entry level are carefully
screened.

This makes it very difficult for the unemployed worker with

few skills to be hired (Hamermesh 1984).
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Dual Labor Market
The dual labor market consists of two separate and distinct markets,
the primary and the secondary segments, with institutionalized barriers
between them.

The primary segment has the characteristics of the internal

market just discussed.

Workers are relatively well paid and have generally

good working conditions.
the norm.

Job training and employment stability are

Employees tend to be responsible and develop loyalties to

the employer because they know that by doing so they will advance in
seniority and receive the benefits of continued promotion opportunity.
The secondary labor market is characterized by low wages, favoritism,
rapid turnover, and high unemployment.

Employers in this market may

have short or unpredictable production schedules, such as in agriculture
or unskilled construction.

The production process typically requires

little or no training and none is provided.

Workers generally do not

have the opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs and formal
seniority programs are nonexistent.

Few employees develop any sort

of loyalty to their employer nor are they apt to develop responsible
work habits because there are no rewards for doing so.

The poor work

habits typical of employees in this market are not discouraged by employers
and, in fact, the unreliable nature of the employment tends to reinforce
and perpetuate those habits which, combined with lack of training, make
the workers unacceptable in the primary market.

It is a dead-end job

market that exists to fulfill the needs of certain types of employers
and from which the unskilled employees have little chance of escaping
(Hamermesh 1984).

This is the market in which the majority of minimum

wage earners participate.

Unless these workers can somehow develop

their skills without the assistance of their employer, and unless they
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can learn responsible work habits without employer related incentive
to do so, they will very likely never earn appreciably more than the
minimum wage (Mellor 1987).
The existence of the neo-classical theories tends to weaken the
validity of the strictly numerical application of orthodox wage theory.
Predicting changes in the wage and labor quantity relationship through
solely the orthodox approach leaves us with many unanswered guestions.
This is illustrated in the example that follows.
Estimating Job Loss Effects
As stated earlier, to estimate the job loss effects of an increase
in the minimum wage, one needs to know the elasticity of labor demand.
One such figure was estimated by combining the results of fourteen studies
performed in the mid 1970's.

The resultant overall one-year elasticity

of labor demand in the United States was estimated to be -0.32 (Hamermesh
1976).

The Minimum Wage Restoration Act of 1987, sponsored by Senator

Edward M. Kennedy, called for increasing the minimum wage to $3.85 in
1988 (Congressional Digest 1987,66).

At that time there were approximately

5.06 million hourly paid workers earning the minimum wage or less (Mellor
1987).

Using these figures, a 14.9 percent increase in the minimum

wage with an elasticity of -0.32, applied to 5.06 million workers, it
can be determined that Senator Kennedy's proposal would have cost approximately
241 thousand jobs (see Footnote 1).

While the loss of that many jobs

would certainly have worked a hardship on the job losers, the overall
Footnote 1:
5.060.000 minimum wage jobs
1% increase = -0.32% jobs
14.9% increase = -0.32 X 14.9 = -4.768% jobs
5.060.000 jobs X -.04768 = 241,261 lost jobs
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societal impact would have been positive in that the extra hourly earnings
of the job keepers, $2.4 million, would have far outweighed the loss
to the job losers, $.8 million, by a net gain of $1.6 million (see Footnote 2).
The pertinent question now becomes; even in light of the overall
net monetary gain to workers, can our society tolerate putting that
many people out of work?

Furthermore, the elasticity estimate used

was for one year; how many of those job losers will be rehired at the
higher wage in subsequent years?

How many of the job losers will be

supporting a family on their income?

How many will be teenagers in

relatively affluent families working only for pocket money?

Nor does

the orthodox scenario consider the impact of neo-classical theories
of employment.

Will the majority of job losers be those with little

chance of being rehired, those in the secondary job market?
The bottom line of this discussion and the purpose of this exercise
is to show that even though high sounding economic data are continually
used either to justify or condemn the minimum wage, that the projections
thus derived are moot.

The real-world implications of raising the minimum

wage are not all addressed by the application of orthodox theory.

The

predictions do not give us the clear answers that its practitioners
would have us believe.

While a basic understanding of orthodox theory

is extremely helpful in evaluating the minimum wage, one should not
place too much emphasis on the numerical results.

Especially considering

that proponents and opponents select the data that best fit their need,

Footnote 2:
5,060,000
241,261
4.818.739

total jobs
lost jobs
jobs retained

4.818.739 X $.50 wage increase = $2,409,369.50
241.261 lost jobs X $3.35
=
808,224.35
$1,601,145.15 net gain
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the evaluation of the subject is not so scientific as they would have
us believe.

The decisions that must be made must be based on normative

values.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE & POVERTY

Poverty and the Working Poor
Thirty three million Americans living in poverty, that means that
approximately one in every seven Americans is officially considered
poor and in need of one or more of the income subsidy or payment in
kind programs, commonly called welfare (Smith and Varichek 1987).
how do we measure poverty, how did we arrive at this figure?

But

Poverty

is a relative concept and means different things to different people.
Various terms are commonly used to describe poverty such as poor, needy,
deprived, low income, and decent standard of living.

Banfield even

goes so far as to distinguish among degrees of poverty; destitution,
want, hardship, and relative deprivation.

He stated that in 1974 no

one met his conditions of destitution; "Lack of income sufficient to
assure physical survival and to prevent suffering from hunger, exposure,
or remedial preventable illness."

He did allow that many were considered

to be suffering from relative deprivation, "Lack of enough income, status,
or whatever else may be valued to prevent one from feeling poor in comparison
to others" (Banfield 1974, 129-130).

The real measure of poverty lies

somewhere in between the extremes presented by Banfield.

As with any

concept, poverty cannot be definitively measured with adjectives or
descriptions, we must resort to the use of numbers.
Our current official definition of the "poverty line" is derived
from the work of Mollie Orshansky in 1963.

Her strategy was to calculate

the cost of a minimal diet, one which met the basic nutritional needs
but with no frills, and multiply it by three.
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She used the number three

because a 1955 Department of Agriculture survey determined that the
average family spent one third of its after-tax income on food.

Although

it has been difficult to find wide agreement on what constitutes a nutritional,
no frills diet and the factor of three has often been questioned, her
formula is still in use today (Harrington 1984).

Political manipulation

of this formula is even easier than the application of selected statistical
data as covered in the previous chapter.

Small adjustments to the cost

of the basic diet can result in statistically moving thousands of people
in or out of poverty.

Nevertheless, this is the formula currently used

in our determination and the cost of the diet is periodically adjusted
by changes in the Consumer Price Index.

The 1987 poverty threshold

for a single person was $5,590, for two people $7,230, for the three
person family $8,570, and $10,990 for a family of four.
An individual who works full-time at the current minimum wage of
$3.35 would earn just under $7,000 per year.

Although a person supporting

only him or herself on that income would not be judged by these standards
to be in poverty, workers with one or more dependents would.

Full-time

employment at the minimum wage, and without deducting any lost time
due to sickness or vacations, would place a family of two at 96 percent
of the poverty level and families of three and four with only one such
wage earner at 81 and 63 percent respectively.
Federal relief cash assistance programs, such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, programs for the permanently and totally disabled,
and for the blind provide for direct payments of money to qualifying
persons or households.

Payment in kind programs provide a commodity

or service rather than money, such as food stamps, public housing subsidies,
and Medicaid.

Because each program is administered separately, some
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at the state level and others federally, and even some by different
state or federal agencies, there is no single qualification criterion
to be met.

Each program has its own unique eligibility requirements

(Bullock, Anderson, and Brady 1983).

None of the programs are based

exclusively on family income as compared to the poverty line and it
is therefore difficult to determine at what income level equivalent
we as a nation wish to support the poor.
It would be instructive to propose an example assuming that we were
able to determine an income level at which we would want to provide
support, say at 90 percent of the poverty level.

If we have a hypothetical

population of 300 full-time minimum wage earners, equally distributed
with 100 supporting one other person, 100 supporting two others, and
100 supporting a family of four, we can come to some conclusions concerning
the results of welfare and those of the minimum wage.

The two person

family groups would require no additional assistance because they are
already earning 96 percent of the poverty level and we have established
our hypothetical support level at 90 percent.

To bring the three and

four person families up to 90 percent, however, would require that we
subsidize them with $745 and $2,923, respectively.

The 100 three member

households would require an annual government payment of $74,500 and

Footnote 3:
3 member poverty level = $8,570 X 90% = $7,713
income = 6,968
subsidy required
745 X 100 = $74,500
4 member poverty level = $10,990 X 90% = $9,891
income = 6,968
subsidy required
2,923 X 100 = $292,300
$74,500 + $292,300 = $366,800 total subsidy required
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the four member units would require $292,300 for a total of $366,800
(see Footnote 3).

Suppose now that we raise the minimum wage by 10

percent to $3.69.

We will also use the average labor demand elasticity

estimate that we used in the example in chapter two, -0.32.

In this

case it would be logical to conclude that three out of the one hundred
wage earners of each family size would lose their jobs and have no income,
whereas the other ninety seven wage earners would receive pay increases.
To replace the total income of the job losers in each category would
cost; two member, $19,521; three member, $23,139; and four member, $29,673,
for a total of $72,333 (see Footnote 4).
On the other hand, there are some savings to be made through reduced
support levels required by the job keepers.

In this example the three

member families would now only require a total of $4,656 and the four
member families only $215,922 for a total annual subsidy of $220,578.
Thus by raising the minimum wage by 10 percent we have reduced the annual
government subsidy requirement from $366,800 to $292,911 for a savings
of $73,889 (see Footnote 5).
The economic reality in the United States is that the choice for many
minimum wage earners is not work or poverty, but work and poverty.
9.1 million Americans live in families where at least one person works
yet their income is still below the poverty line (Smith and Varichek
1987).

The point of the preceding example is that there is a definite

trade-off between the established minimum wage and the total cost of
Footnote 4;
2 member:
3 member:
4 member:

90% poverty level = $6,507
90% poverty level = $7,713
90% poverty level = $9,891
income replacement

X3 =
X3 =
X3 =
costs
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$19,521
$23,139
$29,673
$72,333

federal and state assistance programs that we variously refer to as
welfare.

A prudently established minimum wage can greatly reduce the

costs of that welfare.

There are still other benefits of the minimum

wage and there are costs.

Examples of each are covered in the next section.

Benefits and Costs of the Minimum Wage
We have established that the relative merits of minimum wage policy
cannot be determined solely through the use of econometric models.
Numerous judgements are reguired that go beyond the capability of statistical
manipulation.

This study does not attempt to answer those remaining

guestions but merely mentions some of the more common issues which have
been raised.

It is left to the reader to evaluate the benefits and

costs as presented here in accordance with his or her own values.
Benefits
The most obvious benefit of the minimum wage is that it raises the
earning power of those at the bottom of the economic ladder.
enhance the guality of life for millions of working Americans.

It can
If set

high enough, it can raise many of them out of poverty and reduce the
cost of current welfare programs to the taxpayer.

It can increase the

incentive for other welfare recipients to seek employment by increasing
the returns of work relative to those of public assistance (Levitan 1979).
Footnote 5:
3 member: 90% poverty level = $7,713
income = 7,665
subsidy required
$
48 X 97 = $4,656
4 member: 90% poverty level = $9,891
income = 7,665
subsidy required
$2,226 X 97 = $215,922
$4,656 + $215,922 subsidy + $72,333 income replacement = $292,911
$366,800 - $292,911 = $73,889 savings
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Some proponents point out that ethnic minorities and women are dis
proportionately represented among minimum wage earners.

They see the

minimum wage as providing a mild form of income redistribution with
the potential to reduce the negative effects of discrimination (Devens
1988).
Still others claim that a higher minimum wage can fight the negative
aspects of the secondary labor market.

They state that the increased

price of labor will encourage employers to provide more on-the job training
in order to appreciate the returns of their higher labor costs.

With

increased employer provided training and increased monetary incentives
to seek stable employment, members of the secondary labor market would
be freer to make the transformation into the mainstream of the primary
market (Hamermesh 1984).
Another commonly held position is that workers are also consumers.
By increasing the minimum wage we are also increasing the amount of
money spent by the minimum wage worker.

Such increases would quickly

translate into increased product demand and lead to general economic
expansion.
Costs
An obvious cost of the minimum wage is that it does, in fact, reduce
employment.

The wide variation in reported job loss effects notwithstanding,

we do know that any meaningful increase in the minimum wage will produce
some decrease in employment.

That decrease may occur as a reduction

in hours worked, perhaps as a movement from full-time toward part-time
employment, or in actual jobs eliminated.

Whatever form it may take,

at least some workers will be made worse off by an increase in the minimum
wage.

Further, a delayed result could be the substitution of production
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capital for low-skilled labor.

Investment in advanced technological

production equipment, such as robotics, might become economically preferable
to employers facing rising labor costs.

In this case many jobs could

be lost forever (Hamermesh 1984).
A common argument against raising the minimum wage is that it increases
the costs of production and that those costs are ultimately passed on
to the consumer in the form of higher prices.

A widespread increase

in consumer prices would create a circular effect wherein the worker,
although making more money, would have relatively no more spending power
than before the wages were increased and consumer prices followed.
Increases in the minimum wage would therefore be inflationary.

Instead

of accomplishing its original purpose of helping the worker, the resultant
inflation would worsen American balance of payments by reducing foreign
consumption of the now higher priced American products.

This position

states that an increase in the minimum wage would actually be detrimental
to the minimum rage worker.
While each of the benefits and costs mentioned here has some merit,
the relative importance of each and their individual effects upon the
worker and the economy as a whole are the bases of continued debate.
This debate is not restricted to the ranks of social and economic theorists,
but is pursued actively in a very real-world forum, the United States
Congress.

Chapter four will address that arena.
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CHAPTER FOUR

FEDERAL WAGE POLICY

For a bill to become law it must successfully negotiate the legislative
process where there are numerous junctures at which the bill may be
killed or drastically altered.

Interest groups, often having high stakes

in the outcomes, can exert great influence upon the entire procedure
and the individual legislators.

They do so both formally and informally.

Informal methods, such as campaign contributions or the extension of
fees for speaking engagements, can often earn the allegiance of individual
lawmakers.

Because interest groups are also an important source of

industry and functional viewpoints, and because they often possess detailed
expertise in their areas of concern, they are often called upon to testify
in formal hearings in both houses.

Interest group influence and manipulation

are often described as having preeminent influence on the legislative
process (Lowi 1969).
Minimum wage legislation is no exception.

The major interests in

promoting minimum wage increases are the labor unions.

Opposition is

generally from coalitions of business interests that would be most affected.
These tend to be businesses in highly competitive industries and where
payrolls constitute large proportions of total product or service costs,
such as described in Chapter Two.

The Farm Bureau, American Hotel and

Motel Association, and various retail groups are typical of minimum
wage opponents.

A brief description of the legislative process follows.

The Legislative Process
Bills may be sponsored and introduced in either house by individual
Congressmen or by joint submission.

Those written in the Executive

branch are normally introduced by the chairman of the committee which
30

has jurisdiction.

The bill is referred to the appropriate committee

where it comes under initial scrutiny and is placed on the calendar.
This is the point of sharpest Congressional focus because failure of
the committee to act on the bill is equivalent to killing it.

The

majority of bills that are unsuccessful are killed at this juncture.
Bills may be handled by the parent committee but are more often assigned
to subcommittees for study and hearings.

Such hearings may be closed

or public and it is here where most of the evaluation and alteration
occur.

It is also here where interest groups may exert their formal

influence.
After often lengthy consideration the subcommittee reports its findings
back to the full committee.

The recommendation may be to take no further

action on the bill, effectively killing it, or to proceed with action
but often with numerous amendments to the original proposal.
committee then determines its recommendation.

The full

If it wishes to proceed

toward passage it orders the bill reported to the House or Senate where
it is placed on the calendar to be debated and subsequently voted on.
Bills are often returned to committee or subcommittee for modification.
Following passage of a bill in either the House or the Senate it is
sent to the other chamber where it is again subjected to a similar process.
Ultimately, through compromise if necessary, both the House and the
Senate must agree to a single legislative document before it is sent
to the White House for signature.

Even having survived the legislative

process the law is still subject to Presidential veto.

The veto can

only be overridden by a two thirds vote in both houses (Congressional
Quarterly Guide to Current American Government 1979).
However, even having become law, bills which require funding are
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still subject to emaciation due to insufficient budgetary support from
either the legislature or executive.

Other bills, such as one concerning

the minimum wage, can be subjected to less than enthusiastic implementation
or enforcement by the bureaucracy.

In this case the only recourse would

be through strong Presidential leadership or action by the Judiciary
(Cobb and Elder 1983).
Powerful and determined interest groups can exert their influence
through every step of the entire process.

A review of recent minimum

wage legislative initiatives is provided in the next section.
Minimum Wage Legislation
The Reagan Administration was typically conservative in condemning
the minimum wage as a constraint to greater employment opportunity.
The President suggested in 1983 that the minimum wage had "priced a
number of people and jobs out of existence." (Congressional Digest
1985, 64:105).

Upon his request, Representative Barber B. Conable,

Jr., NY, R. and Senator Robert J. Dole, KS, R. introduced companion
FLSA amendment proposals to the Congress which provided for a youth
subminimum wage. Unlike the interim subminimum wage allowances made
in 1961 and 1966 in conjunction with expansion of coverage, youth subminimum
programs are designed to become permanent.

The rationale for such action

is to provide increased employment opportunity for young people with little
employment experience and few skills.
The 1983 measures were referred to the House Committees on Ways
and Means and Education and Labor and in the Senate to the Finance Committee.
No action was taken by the committees and the proposals were therefore
killed in both chambers.
In May of 1984, again in response to Presidential initiative, a
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modified version of the Conable/Dole bill was presented by Senator Charles
H. Percy, IL, R. and Representative Ron Packard, CA, R.

The proposals

were referred to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee and
to the Education and Labor Committee in the House.

President Reagan's

message to the Congress was, in part:
Studies over the past decade have repeatedly demonstrated that
the minimum wage has reduced job opportunities for large numbers
our youths. (64:128).
In the Senate hearings that followed, James G. O'Hara, Chairman of the
Minimum Wage Study Commission created by the 1977 FLSA amendment, was
called to testify.

Mr. O'Hara complained that the conservative sponsors

had exaggerated and misapplied the data which were contained in the
study commission report.

In testimony he also stated the following:

If suggestions were made that the very real problems of women or
members of minority groups should be solved by paying them less
for their labor, such a proposal would be rejected out of hand as
fundamentally unjust. (64:127).
Although the Percy/Packard bill was pushed hard by the Administration
as well as by business interest groups, no further action was taken
and the subminimum wage proposal failed in the 98th Congress.
The 1983 and 1984 rounds were attempts by the conservatives to weaken
the FLSA through subminimum wage provisions.

In the 99th Congress of

1985-1986 a bill was introduced by the Democrats to raise the minimum
wage.

The Republicans also tried again but this time their bill would

have eliminated it altogether.

Both initiatives resulted in no action

from the responsible committees and they fell by the wayside.
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, MA, D . , Chairman of the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, introduced the Minimum Wage Restoration Act
of 1987 to the 100th Congress.

A companion bill was simultaneously
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submitted in the House by Representative Augustus F. Hawkins, CA, D.,
Chairman of the Committee on Education and labor.

The proposed legislation

would have increased the minimum wage to $3.85 in 1988, to $4.25 in
1989, and to $4.65 in 1990.
July of 1987.

The hearings were conducted April through

Testimony in favor of the increase was received from

the AFL/CIO, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union, and
the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

Opponents testifying

included the American Farm Bureau, the American Hotel and Motel Association,
the Manufacturing Jewelers and Silversmiths of America, and a prominent
business leader, John R. Glennie.

In typical fashion, the business

groups quoted various economic studies alluding to the number of jobs
that would be lost as well as the inflationary impact of raising the
wage floor.

The unions countered with studies of their own which minimized

the negative economic effects and stressed the minimum wage as necessary
to provide a decent standard of living as well as its potential to reduce
welfare costs (Congressional Digest 1987,66).
The measures were approved by committee in both houses and went
to the floor of the House in May and to the full Senate in September
of 1988.

Debate in both houses consisted largely of the same rhetoric

presented at the hearings in committee as well as proposals and counter
proposals for amendments.

Split along nearly partisan lines, the bill

became stalled in the House in mid-summer and failed to come to a vote
in the Senate by late September

(Lawrence 1988) (Morehouse 1988).

Meanwhile George Bush, the Republican presidential nominee, departed
from the Reagan Administration's hard line by announcing that he would
support a modest increase in the minimum wage if it were tied to a lower
training wage for new workers.

In March of 1989 Elizabeth Dole, President
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Bush's new selection as Secretary of Labor, announced the new administration's
position.

The President would accept a stepped increase in the minimum

wage of 90<t over three years to $4.25 by 1992.

The increase was contingent

upon a subminimum training wage of $3.35 that would apply to new hirees
for the first six months of employment.

The Democrats, led by Senator

Kennedy, attacked the Bush proposal as being too small as well as vigorously
opposing the subminimum provisions.

Secretary Dole countered that the

President would hold the line at his original offer and veto any legislation
that went beyond those stipulations.

The Democrats in the House, however,

with agreement of the labor unions, agreed to compromise by reducing
their opposition to the training wage but insisted that it apply only
to new hirees with no previous work experience.

They also agreed to

a slight reduction in the dollar figure to $4.55 by 1991.

The House

bill was approved by a vote of 248-171 on March 23rd.
As of mid-April the measure is still being considered in the Senate
where there is a great deal of contention over the subminimum training
wage.

The Republicans insist that it is necessary to protect business

from the overall impact of the wage increase.

The Democrats argue that

the applicability of the training wage to all new employees, rather
than just to those without previous work experience, could lead to hireand-fire strategies by minimum wage employers negating the benefit of
the higher wage.

What the final resolution in the Senate will be is

unknown at this time but it is expected that the Democrats will at least
place some constraints on the subminimum wage similar to those of the
House.

Nevertheless, President Bush is still holding adamantly to his

pledge to veto any measure which goes beyond his original offer (Grand
Forks Herald, March-April 1988).
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The minimum wage amendment has become one of the first serious conflicts
to arise between the new Administration and the Congress.

Whatever

the Senate agrees to must be eventually resolved in Joint Conmittee
with the House before going to the President.

It is unlikely that the

final product of the Legislature will be a bill that meets the President's
conditions, especially since the House has already gone beyond them.
In this early test of the Administration's resolve, it is also unlikely
that the President will back down on his ultimatum.
an uncomfortable precedent.

That would set

If there is insufficient support in either

house for an override of the veto, the likelihood of a minimum wage
increase becoming law this year appears doubtful.
The battle-lines are clearly drawn, the Democrats and the labor
unions versus the Republicans and business interests.

The inability

of the opponents to compromise on current legislation appears certain.
What is needed is a new minimum wage proposal that will allow compromise
in other areas rather than just the current issues of dollar amount
and the subminimum contingency.

Just such a proposal is presented in

the next chapter.

36

CHAPTER FIVE
RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion
The Great Depression of the 1930's signalled the final demise of
the philosophy of Social Darwinism.

It was a period during which millions

of middle class Americans, not just the lazy and the unfit, became acutely
aware of the meaning of poverty.

A new philosophy, that government

played a role in the economic well-being of its citizens, emerged.
The Fair Labor Standards Act was one of the ramifications of the new
philosophy.

Intended to protect the American worker and to provide

a decent return on his labor, the Act has endured to the present day.
Nevertheless, it also remains a controversy between liberal and conservative
values and continues to create extensive debate.

Coverage under the

Act has been expanded periodically as has the minimum wage itself.
Major expansion of coverage occurred in 1961 and 1966 and in both cases
a four to five year subminimum wage was provided to allow newly effected
businesses to adjust.
jobs are covered.

Today, roughly ninety percent of nonsupervisory

Traditionally the minimum wage has been set at roughly

fifty percent of the average hourly wage of nonsupervisory workers.
The last adjustment to the wage was in 1981 when it was set at $3.35
an hour.

Since 1981 increases in the cost of living and general wage

escalation have reduced the minimum wage to less than thirty eight percent
of the national average, its lowest level in forty years.

While about

ninety percent of nonsupervisory workers are subject to the minimum,
some ten percent remain in the uncovered sector.

That sector consists

of industries which typically are highly competitive and with labor
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costs constituting high percentages of final product prices, such as retail
and service industries.

While the Federal government has not produced

new minimum wage legislation since 1981, the individual states have
been active.

All but nine states now provide their own worker protections,

eighteen have universal coverage, and ten require wages above the Federal
minimum.
Orthodox economic wage theory, through the effects of supply and
demand, has shown that there is a negative relationship between wages
and employment.

To make valid predictions based on orthodox theory

it is necessary to use reliable elasticity estimates.

Several studies

have been conducted which have yielded a wide range of results.

The

liberals or conservatives have had only to select those results which
reflect their differing ideological viewpoints.

The job rationing model

suggests that the size of the covered sector relative to that of the
uncovered sector is also important in determining the results of a mandated
wage increase.

However, neo-classical theories question the reliability

of orthodox prediction because of the effects of seniority provisions,
wage rigidity, and the existence of an unmotivated and untrained secondary
labor market.

The easily manipulated application of orthodox theory

leaves many unanswered questions, such as, does an overall increase in
the income of job keepers offset the normally smaller overall loss to
job losers?

While economic theory can provide general guidelines to

understanding the minimum wage, it cannot be a substitute for the normative
judgements that are essential to equitable resolution.
As the FLSA was born of the Great Depression, so was the concept
of government largesse for the needy, welfare.

The minimum wage can

be an effective instrument to decrease the cost of welfare.
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The debate

is essentially one of determining who is to pay for that largesse, the
taxpayer or industry.

Low, or nonexistant, minimum wages can act as

a subsidy to low wage employers at the expense of the public.

Higher

minimum wages can shift the responsibility back to industry and provide
greater employment incentive to workers.

Nevertheless,

a higher wage

floor will result in some increase in unemployment and can contribute
to inflationary pressure.

What is needed is a determination of the

right mix of government subsidy and industry responsibility.

That determination

must necessarily be made by the Legislature.
The legislative process is one that is subject to considerable influence
by powerful interest groups.

Business and labor interests continually

vie for the attention of the legislators and achieving the right mix
is essentially a process of balancing those interests.

During the Reagan

Administration the conservative ideology had the upper hand.

The new

Administration is prepared to grant concessions but they are far short
of what the liberals are demanding.

Recent Democratic attempts in the

Congress to raise the wage floor have resulted in extensive debate and
will probably be thwarted by President Bush's hard-line position.

What

is needed now is a new approach to minimum wage legislation, an approach
providing more leeway for compromise between the adversaries, and one
that will enhance the benefits of the FLSA without severely constraining
the growth of the economy.
A New Approach
While it appears that the minimum wage is overdue for an increase,
an ineguitable situation also exists by not having universal coverage.
Those industries which are not subject to the law are being subsidized
by both the taxpayer, through higher welfare costs, and the unskilled
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employees themselves who have little choice of their employer.

Although

the increased costs to such employers would ultimately be paid by the
consumer, that would be far more equitable than the present arrangement.
As the situation presently exists, many employers are already paying
above the Federal minimum, partially due to state laws and partially
due to localized labor demand.

Now, while the wage rates are low, is

the perfect time to expand the coverage.

If wage rates are allowed

to increase before such expansion, it would be increasingly expensive
for newly covered employers and therefore much more difficult to achieve.
In addition to more equitably assigning responsibility to the uncovered
areas that are currently subsidized, expansion to universal coverage
would also eliminate the negative aspects of the job rationing scenario.
It could also simplify enforcement procedures through removal of most
of the exceptions.

Further, it presents a very real possibility of

decreasing the ingrained traits of the secondary labor market by bringing
it into the mainstream of primary employment practices.
The specific proposal is to expand the coverage of the FLSA to all
employees with very limited exceptions.

Those who are self-employed

could not be effectively included for they are self-employed by choice.
Also, current allowances for tipped employees and for handicapped workers
in sheltered workshops appear to be equitable and should be maintained.
The current exemption which allows for full-time student employment
at subminimum wages in selected industries should be maintained but
it should be altered to include all industries.

The program appears

to be a benefit to students who only require part-time or temporary
employment.

There is, however, no reason to limit such employment to

only agriculture, retail, or higher education.
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It would be necessary

to maintain and expand current subminimum student certification procedures
to preclude possible widespread abuse.

As in past expansions of coverage,

newly covered employers should be granted subminimum authority for up
to five years to allow for industry adjustment.
It appears unlikely that, under a Republican President, the Democratically
controlled Congress will succeed in achieving its desired amount of
increase in the minimum wage for at least the next four years.

Furthermore,

the Administration has tied even modest increases to the stipulation
of a subminimum training wage.

It is therefore recommended that the

liberal coalition considerably reduce the size of its rate increase
demands.

Instead, it should attempt to trade that increase for a concession

in expanded coverage.

In the absence of what appear to them to be unreasonably

high rate demands, the conservatives would be less inclined to hold
fast to their training wage stipulation.

It is entirely possible that

I by acceding to conservative pressures on the dollar amount, that the
liberals may be able to make important advances in the area of coverage.
It may be to the American worker's advantage to make that move now and
to postpone large increases in the minimum wage until such time as it
becomes politically promising.
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